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As regards metaphors, Shakespeare, as always, is the master: 
The flame o’ the taper 
Bows toward her; and would under-peep her lids, 
To see the enclosed lights, now canopied 
Under these windows, white and azure, lac’d 
With blue of heaven’s own tinct.1 
The description of Cytherea is that of a beautiful apparition. The 
flame, personified, bows towards her; her eyes are lights that are 
“canopied” while sleeping. Hidden by eyelids, in other words. Their 
blueness is no less compelling than the unworldly blue of heaven. Her 
eyes are, in effect, like windows and like heaven.  
At least that’s one possible reading. Literature scholars disagree on 
exactly what the extended metaphor is. Is Shakespeare referring to 
Cytherea’s eyes (“lights”, white cornea laced with blue iris), her eyelids 
(“enclosed lights, now canopied”), both eyes and eyelids (white skin, blue  
 
                                                                                                                       
*  Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Director of York Centre for Public 
Law and Policy. Many thanks to Lillianne Cadieux-Shaw for research assistance, my faculty 
colleague Sonia Lawrence, and the very perceptive comments of two anonymous reviewers. 
Many would know that my title is a play on Bob Dylan’s lyric “You don’t need a weatherman 
to know which way the wind blows”, from Subterranean Homesick Blues on Bringing it all Back 
Home (1965, Columbia Records). Many may not know that it is one of the most quoted song lyrics 
in the law, and Dylan is the most quoted songwriter by quite a margin: see Alex B. Long, “[Insert 
Song Lyrics Here]: The Uses and Misuses of Popular Music Lyrics in Legal Writing” (2007) 64 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 531. 
1  William Shakespeare, Cymbeline, Act II, 2.13-23. 
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eyes), or something else? Since the mysteries of Shakespeare’s metaphors 
have confounded many literary critics, we lesser mortals likely will never 
know. At any rate, there does seem to be some suggestion of a person 
resembling built materials like windows and canopies, shaded and painted 
(“tinctured”) in white, azure and blue.2 One might, hesitatingly, call it an 
example of an architecture motif in Shakespeare. 
Somewhat surprisingly, architecture also forms a metaphorical backdrop 
to the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision on Senate reform, 
Reference re Senate Reform.3 This article argues Shakespeare’s literary 
metaphors are appropriate, while the Supreme Court’s constitutional ones 
are not. 
II. THE SENATE REFERENCE 
Reforming the Senate has been a part-time constitutional obsession 
almost from the day Canada was formed.4 And yet, the only serious 
institutional changes that have taken place are the increase in members 
(to 1055) and the introduction of mandatory retirement at age 75.6  
Throughout much of his adult political life, former Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper has believed strongly in Senate reform. He quotes from 
Robert Mackay’s 1926 book The Unreformed Senate,7 detailing a 
number of criticisms of the Canadian Senate, and promoting its 
transformation.8 Harper favours a Senate that is equal, elected and 
effective  the well-known Triple-E formulation, although he rarely 
uses the acronym.9 It is no surprise, therefore, that Harper’s reform 
agenda has dominated since he became Prime Minister. Beginning in 
                                                                                                                       
2  For examples of the debate surrounding a small passage of a relatively obscure 
Shakespeare play, see Werner Habicht, D.J. Palmer & Roger Pringle, ed., Images of Shakespeare: 
Proceedings of the Third Congress of the International Shakespeare Association, 1986 (Cranberry, 
NJ: Associated University Presses, Cranbury, 1988), at 85-86. 
3  [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter the “Reference”]. 
4  See Reference, id., at para. 1. 
5  Constitution Act, 1867, s. 21. The original number was 72; the number 105 was reached 
with Nunavut’s creation: see Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut), S.C. 1998, c. 15, Pt. 2. The 
maximum number of Senators has also changed  see Constitution Act, 1867, s. 28. 
6  Constitution Act, 1867, s. 29(2). This was changed from life tenure in 1965: Constitution 
Act, 1965, S.C. 1965, c. 4. 
7  New York: Oxford University Press, 1926. 
8  Alexander Wilkinson notes Harper’s frequent reference to Mackay’s book in “Constitutional 
Constraints: A Case Against Senate Reform in Canada” (2011) Institute for Research on Public Policy, 
Policy Options blog, accessed July 13, 2015, online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/continuity-and-
change-in-the-provinces/constitutional-constraints-a-case-against-senate-reform-in-canada/>. 
9  Id. 
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2006, in his first minority government, he tabled Bill S-4 limiting term 
limits to eight years without renewal. The Bill died on recommendation 
of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. 
Bills S-7 and C-19 reintroduced the main thrust of S-7; a year later, Bill 
C-20, known as the Senate Appointment Consultations Act established a 
procedure for electing senators based on a voter preference system. Bill 
C-20 also died on the Order Paper in September 2008 when Parliament 
dissolved.10  
Finally, Bill C-7, given first reading in June of 2011, became the 
focal point for the current reform proposals. It made its way to the 
Supreme Court of Canada as a reference case, known as Reference re 
Senate Reform. The Court was asked to decide four main questions, all of 
which engaged the amending provisions of Part V of the Constitution 
Act, 1982: (i) can Parliament unilaterally implement a framework for 
consultative elections to the Senate, whether involving the provinces or 
not?; (ii) can Parliament unilaterally fix term limits for Senators?; (iii) 
can the Senate be abolished with less than unanimous consent of the 
provinces?; and (iv) can Parliament unilaterally remove the landholding 
requirements for Senators?11 
In February 2014, the full eight-judge panel12 rendered a decision  
en banc that put at least a few more nails in the coffin of Senate reform 
in general, and Harper’s vision for it in particular. 
Considering the importance and gravity of the decision, the Court 
was fairly brief in dispensing with all the government’s proposals (the 
landholding requirement being the only exception as the Court accepted 
that Parliament alone could remove the requirement for all provinces 
except Quebec). In fewer than 100 substantive paragraphs, all four of the 
main proposals are summarily rejected. Paragraph 111 says it all: 
The majority of the changes to the Senate which are contemplated  
in the Reference can only be achieved through amendments to  
the Constitution, with substantial federal-provincial consensus.  
                                                                                                                       
10  The history surrounding the various Bills dealing with Senate reform is detailed in the 
Reference, at paras. 6-9; see also University of Alberta, Centre for Constitutional Studies, Democratic 
Governance: Senate Reform Update, online: <http://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/ccs/index.php/ 
constitutional-issues/democratic-governance/849-senate-reform-update>, accessed July 13, 2015. 
11  Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 2. 
12  The Court was only eight judges strong for much of 2014, as the October 2013 
appointment of Marc Nadon was challenged (and the subject of another significant constitutional 
decision by the Supreme Court: see Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. 
No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.)). 
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The implementation of consultative elections and senatorial term limits 
requires consent of the Senate, the House of Commons, and the 
legislative assemblies of at least seven provinces representing, in the 
aggregate, half of the population of all the provinces (s. 38 and  
s. 42(1)(b), Constitution Act, 1982). A full repeal of the property 
qualifications requires the consent of the legislative assembly of 
Quebec (s. 43, Constitution Act, 1982). As for Senate abolition, it 
requires the unanimous consent of the Senate, the House of Commons, 
and the legislative assemblies of all Canadian provinces (s. 41(e), 
Constitution Act, 1982).13 
The Senate Reference has prompted a host of eloquent commentary  
on the effect of this decision on matters such as constitutional reform,14 
the need for a more democratic process,15 the approach the Supreme 
Court takes to constitutional interpretation and its effect that has on 
amending the Constitution,16 the importance of constitutional metaphors 
in general and the Reference in particular,17 and more.  
This article does not aim to contribute substantively to those 
discussions; rather, my interest in the Reference is more literary. As I read 
                                                                                                                       
13  Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 111. 
14  On how the decision will have limited effect on reform, see Linda Trimble, “Status Quo 
Unacceptable; Senate Reform Possible; Abolition by Stealth Anti-Democratic” (2015) 24(2) Constitutional 
Forum. For a contrary viewpoint, see Ted Morton, “No Statecraft, Questionable Jurisprudence: How the 
Supreme Court Tried to Kill Senate Reform” (2015) SPP Research Paper No. 8-21. 
15  See Allan Hutchinson & Joel I. Colon-Rios, “Constitutionalising the Senate: A Modest 
Democratic Proposal”, paper presented at the McGill Symposium on the Senate Reference, January 22, 
2015 (copy on file with author). 
16  Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States” in  
J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
181 and his follow up article, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth” (2015) 60 McGill L.J. 
(forthcoming, available at SSRN online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589255>); Douglas Sarro, 
“Breaking the Bargain: A Comment on the Constitutionality of Bill C-7, the Proposed Senate 
Reform Act” (2012) 70 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 115; Peter Hogg, “Senate Reform and the Constitution” 
(2015) 68 S.C.L.R. (2d) 591. Kate Glover’s forceful defence of the metaphor, “Structure, Substance 
and Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the Senate Reform Reference” in J. Cameron, 
B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221 is really an argument for the idea of 
structural interpretation  using underlying principles, notions of a document’s framework and 
codes to assist in interpreting text. I do not take issue with this “holistic” approach to interpretation; 
my concern is with the use of metaphors to do so. Moving the physical location of the Senate from 
Ottawa to Toronto would surely be an “architectural” change (presumably a new building would be 
required) but would it be a “structural” one?! 
17  Warren Newman, “Of Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and Structural 
Constitution”, unpublished paper presented at the 2015 Conference on Emerging Issues in Canadian 
Public Law, University of Ottawa, May 22, 2015 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter “Newman”]; 
Kate Glover, “Structure, Substance and Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the Senate 
Reform Reference” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221. 
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the decision, what struck me most, after the shock of the forcefulness of the 
rejection, was the frequent allusion to our constitutional architecture.  
In the Reference decision the Court relies on the metaphor of 
architecture an extravagant 10 times (11 if a subheading is counted). 
Here are all 10 in order: 
● 1 and 2. Paragraph 26: “These rules and principles of interpretation 
have led this Court to conclude that the Constitution should be 
viewed as having an ‘internal architecture’, or ‘basic constitutional 
structure’: Secession Reference, at para. 50; OPSEU v. Ontario 
(Attorney General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at p. 57; see also Supreme 
Court Act Reference, at para. 82. The notion of architecture 
expresses the principle that ‘[t]he individual elements of the 
Constitution are linked to the others, and must be interpreted by 
reference to the structure of the Constitution as a whole’.” 
● 3 and 4: Paragraph 27: “As discussed, the Constitution should not 
be viewed as a mere collection of discrete textual provisions. It has 
an architecture, a basic structure. By extension, amendments to the 
Constitution are not confined to textual changes. They include 
changes to the Constitution’s architecture.” 
● 5. Paragraph 53: “We conclude that each of the proposed consultative 
elections would constitute an amendment to the Constitution of 
Canada and require substantial provincial consent under the 
general amending procedure, without the provincial right to ‘opt 
out’ of the amendment (s. 42). We reach this conclusion for three 
reasons: (1) the proposed consultative elections would fundamentally 
alter the architecture of the Constitution…” 
● 6. Paragraph 54: “The implementation of consultative elections 
would amend the Constitution of Canada by fundamentally altering 
its architecture. It would modify the Senate’s role within our 
constitutional structure as a complementary legislative body of 
sober second thought.” 
● 7. Paragraph 59: “The appointed status of Senators, with its 
attendant assumption that appointment would prevent Senators 
from overstepping their role as a complementary legislative body, 
shapes the architecture of the Constitution Act, 1867. It explains 
why the framers did not deem it necessary to textually specify how 
the powers of the Senate relate to those of the House of Commons 
or how to resolve a deadlock between the two chambers....” 
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● 8. Paragraph 60: “The proposed consultative elections would 
fundamentally modify the constitutional architecture we have just 
described and, by extension, would constitute an amendment to the 
Constitution. They would weaken the Senate’s role of sober second 
thought and would give it the democratic legitimacy to 
systematically block the House of Commons, contrary to its 
constitutional design.” 
● 9. Paragraph 70: “We conclude that introducing a process of 
consultative elections for the nomination of Senators would change 
our Constitution’s architecture, by endowing Senators with a 
popular mandate which is inconsistent with the Senate’s role as a 
complementary legislative chamber of sober second thought…” 
● 10. Paragraph 97: “We cannot accept the Attorney General’s 
arguments. Abolition of the Senate is not merely a matter of 
‘powers’ or ‘members’ under s. 42(1)(b) and (c) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Rather, abolition of the Senate would 
fundamentally alter our constitutional architecture — by removing 
the bicameral form of government that gives shape to the 
Constitution Act, 1867 — and would amend Part V, which requires 
the unanimous consent of Parliament and the provinces (s. 41(e), 
Constitution Act, 1982).”18 
A few things about this list are immediately apparent. First is that the 
initial two uses of the metaphor in paragraphs 26 and 27 come with a 
further explanation: an architecture implies that there is some connection 
between elements of the Constitution; that there is a basic structure. The 
additional phrases are telling. Either the Court is uncomfortable with the 
metaphor standing on its own, or is trying to ensure that the meaning of 
the metaphor is made clear to everyone. Moreover, the early reference 
includes an actual attempt to define the term: “the notion of architecture 
expresses the principle that individual elements…”.  
Second, “architecture” is set up as something different from the 
constitutional “text”. This is clear from the passage “amendments are not 
confined to the text [but] can include the architecture”.19 Perhaps the 
“architecture” of our Constitution is the design or structure, while “text” 
is the bricks that get us there. But that is just speculation on my part.  
Third, it is not clear whether “architecture”, “structure” and “design” 
all refer to exactly the same idea, or slightly different ones. The Court 
uses all of them, sometimes interchangeably (para. 27: “an architecture, 
                                                                                                                       
18  The italicizing of “architecture” throughout these quotations is mine. 
19  Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 27. 
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basic structure”) but not always (para. 60: “fundamentally modify the 
constitutional architecture … contrary to its constitutional design”). And 
finally, architecture sometimes seems to refer to a fixed concept 
(para. 27: a “basic structure”) and is at other times more fluid (para. 59: 
“appoint[ing]… Senators … shapes the architecture”).  
Despite the multiple references, the Court leaves unanswered 
questions about what the architecture metaphor is doing. Does the 
metaphor function independently of the Court’s opinion? Does it require 
further elaboration? Is it the same or different from the text itself? Is it 
the same or different from “structure”? Is the metaphor itself capable of 
multiple meanings?  
As I have stated in a different context, legal metaphors are very often 
inappropriate, and should be avoided in judicial decisions, particularly 
constitutional ones. In contemplating the “dialogue” metaphor in 
constitutional adjudication, Michael Sobkin and I expressed our concern 
as follows: 
Our hope is that all courts, including the Supreme Court, recognize, at a 
minimum, that it is wrong to use the dialogue metaphor prescriptively; 
better yet, they should see this as a good time to move on from 
discussing the metaphor at all. … Judges should strive to…keep all 
metaphors to a minimum, as these are literary devices not necessarily 
useful for, and possibly detrimental to, resolving legal disputes.20  
As I discuss next, the uncertainty highlights the main reason why 
relying on metaphors for normative decision making is inappropriate in 
judicial opinions. In fact, I am inclined to go further and suggest that 
many of those involved in the law  lawyers, legal academics, judges 
and others  should be more careful when relying on metaphors to 
illuminate complex concepts and problems.  
III. METAPHORS AND THEIR PROBLEMS 
I am all in favour of judges, and legal writers in general, being more 
poetic, more attuned to the elegance of language. All students love Lord 
Denning. Every year I am made aware of their appreciation for opening 
lines like “It happened on 19 April, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent…. 
                                                                                                                       
20  Richard Haigh & Michael Sobkin, “Does the Observer Have an Effect?: An Analysis of 
the Use of the Dialogue Metaphor in Canada’s Courts” (2007) 45(1) Osgoode Hall L.J. 67, at 90. 
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On this day [the Hinz family] drove out in a Bedford Dormobile van 
from Tonbridge to Canvey Island…. As they were coming back they 
turned into a lay-by at Thurnham to have a picnic tea”21 or “Old Herbert 
Bundy was a farmer there. His home was at Yew Tree Farm. It went 
back for 300 years.… It was his only asset. But he did a very foolish 
thing. He mortgaged it to the bank. Up to the very hilt.”22  
They are perfect factual vignettes and I agree that more judgments 
should be written like this. Not only are they more enjoyable to read and 
more accessible to the average person, but they also tend to be more 
persuasive. Thus, rhetorical flourishes have their place in law, as in other 
forms of literature.23 
Nevertheless, I wonder if relying on substantive constitutional 
metaphors, that have some measure of normative and interpretive force, 
is potentially risky. Metaphors are figuratively true but literally false. To 
say that a law may chill speech is obviously not physically true  laws 
have no effect on the temperature of speech (which is unmeasurable 
anyway!). What we mean when we say that a law may chill speech is 
that it may deter certain kinds or forms of speech, which would, absent 
such law, otherwise be spoken. As Eugene Volokh puts it, terms such as 
“chilling speech” in legal language have some truth to them but only to 
the extent that they describe concrete mechanisms and not just abstract 
metaphors.24  
Metaphors are literary devices; they make writing come alive. They 
may offer alternate explanations of ideas and concepts that can 
illuminate, for some, those very concepts and ideas in ways that were not 
easily comprehensible in their original form. But when we use them to 
describe in law how good expression may be unnecessarily curtailed, for 
example, it is usually much more crucial to continue the exploration. 
Saying something “chills speech” may be just the beginning. What forms 
of expression would be curtailed? Why? Would it curtail everyone’s 
                                                                                                                       
21  Hinz v. Berry, [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1074, at paras. 1-2 (C.A.). 
22  Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [1974] 3 All E.R. 757, [1975] Q.B. 326, at para. 1 (C.A.). 
For a balanced critique of Denning’s career, see Charles Stephens, The Jurisprudence of Lord 
Denning: A Study in Legal History, in Three Volumes (London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2009). Stephens quotes from Sir Stephen Sedley, who notes that Denning’s literary style is one of his 
great achievements, by speaking directly to the people in lucid prose (at 5). 
23  See Chad M. Oldfather, “The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors 
in Judicial Opinions” (1994) 27 Conn. L. Rev. 17, at 21; Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in 
Reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), at 136. 
24  Eugene Volokh, Academic Legal Writing, 4th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2010) 
[hereinafter “Volokh”], at 114-115. 
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speech or only some people’s? Is it wrong that such speech should be 
curtailed? Will harm result to those held back from expressing 
themselves? Will harm occur to others if the restraint does not take 
place? What kinds of harm? And so on. If the metaphor is left 
unexplained, the argument is incomplete. And if it is further explained, 
then it begs the question of why have it in the first place.  
The noted literary critic Northrop Frye recognized that metaphors 
may be both unnecessary and confusing to professionals trained in other 
than purely literary disciplines:  
It is projected metaphor to say that a flower “knows” when it is time for 
it to bloom, and of course to say that “nature knows” is merely to 
import a faded mother-goddess cult into biology. I can well understand 
that in their own field biologists would find such teleological 
metaphors both unnecessary and confusing, a fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness.25  
Moreover, a metaphor turns its back on ordinary descriptive 
meaning, and presents a linguistic structure which literally is ironic and 
paradoxical. As Frye states, in ordinary descriptive meaning, if A is B 
then B is A, and all we have really said is that A is itself. In a metaphor 
two things are identified while each retains its own form.26  
If, for example, we say that the Constitution has an architecture, then 
we identify the Constitution with the ordinary understanding of 
architecture as building, while at the same time both the Constitution and 
architecture are identified as themselves. The analogy is hypothetical  
the Constitution is like architecture (descriptive) or the Constitution is as 
architecture (formalist)  in other words, the Constitution is to 
governance/internal logic/concepts of organizing society as architecture 
is to organized built elements. But the problem is that it is not always 
clear which of those analogies the Supreme Court intends. The common 
factor between the two could be organization but it could be aesthetic, 
pragmatic, or something different entirely.27 
All of us engaged in using language professionally need to be aware 
of both the power and limits of metaphor. I once used a metaphor to 
explain to students how assessing whether the Canadian Charter of 
                                                                                                                       
25  Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 89. 
26  Id., at 123. 
27  Id., at 124. 
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Rights and Freedoms28 applies to a given situation depends on myriad 
factors, which can point in opposite directions. The factors help fill in the 
gap that exists between the endpoints of the Charter clearly applying and 
the Charter clearly not applying. My metaphor related to the raising of 
children, who mature from a point at which they have no autonomy to 
another point where they have full autonomy. In between, a child’s 
autonomy grows; it is very difficult to find the specific time when one 
can say that suddenly a child is autonomous.  
I hoped my metaphor would help explain when the Charter applies. 
Then I began to think that perhaps some students have had very different 
relationships with their parents, and are not able to think of the 
relationship in terms of autonomy vs. dependence at all. Maybe their 
parents abused them, abandoned them, were unloving; or they could be 
so-called helicopter parents who still have not granted them much 
autonomy, or conversely, were never there for them at all. Instead of 
clarifying, the metaphor may only have confused or complicated the 
matter. Rather than act as a device to assess whether the Charter could 
apply to a given situation, the metaphor caused them to associate Charter 
application problems with private matters at home: unhelpful at best, 
detrimental and counterproductive to understanding at worst.  
So, while metaphors provide colour and interest, and make writing 
more vivid, they can also obfuscate and cast doubt on meaning. 
Metaphors can illuminate ideas that are very difficult to convey in 
language; but they can also be imprecise, lead to logical error and 
therefore, incompleteness. They may also distract the reader from the 
ultimate point that is being sought. For this reason, metaphors are never 
used in statutory texts or in contracts, where clarity, certainty and 
consistency are paramount qualities. Volokh states it succinctly: 
“remember that the heart of [an] argument should be the real, not the 
figurative”.29  
To me, this is just as true for the architecture metaphor as it is for 
any other metaphor that a legal writer may use. In the constitutional law 
realm, our Supreme Court has developed a number of metaphors in an 
attempt to elucidate the Constitution: from “living tree” to “ships” to 
                                                                                                                       
28  Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “Charter”]. 
29  Volokh, supra, note 24, at 115. See also Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1967) who recognized that metaphors should never be more than “servants to be 
discharged as soon as they have fulfilled their function” (at 121). 
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“operating machinery” to “lifeblood”,30 all are useful, but only in a 
limited sense. Relying too heavily on metaphors is a slippery slope 
(another metaphor!). It is too easy to let figurative usage do the heavy 
lifting of rigour and persuasion. Using constitutional metaphors may 
cause more problems than it seeks to resolve and should never be a 
substitute for argumentation, elucidation and clarity.31  
My concern with metaphors in general becomes more specific in the 
Reference. Although the Supreme Court tries to explain its architecture 
metaphor, it isn’t always perfectly transparent what it means by the 
term.32 For example, the Court uses the architecture metaphor to neatly 
avoid what is plain from the text of the Constitution itself. Section 42 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 requires that the seven-fifty amending 
procedure be applied as the “method of selecting Senators”. As the 
government argued, this “method” has always been one whereby  
the Prime Minister recommends a candidate who is then appointed by the 
Governor-General. According to the Court, however, implementing non-
binding or consultative elections would “change our Constitution’s 
architecture” and thus require the seven-fifty amending formula. The 
words “method of selecting Senators” are only to be used as a “[guide] to 
identifying the aspects of our system of government…”.33 The metaphor, 
in other words, says more about our Constitution than the text itself. 
Whereas my larger worries are with using metaphors in legal writing 
generally, the Reference has given me an excuse to examine further the 
                                                                                                                       
30  As further proof of the confounding nature of judicial metaphors, see Hugo Cyr, 
“Conceptual Metaphors for an Unfinished Constitution” (2014) 19 Rev. Const. Studies 1. Cyr takes 
approximately 14 pages (from 18-32) to discuss the “living tree” metaphor in Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence. He examines the “roots of the tree”, the “natural limits of the growth 
and expansion of the tree” and the “principle of the living tree’s expansion and growth”, in an 
attempt to explain what the metaphor means and how it works. It’s a masterly dissection, but it 
certainly fuels my argument that any metaphor requiring this much analysis is not likely all that 
helpful to understanding a judicial decision. 
31  For a good summary on the debate about metaphors in legal writing, see Robert L. Tsai, 
“Fire, Metaphor and Constitutional Myth-Making” (2004) 93 Georgetown L.J. 181, citing a number 
of legal scholars and judges who disdained overuse of metaphor, such as Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin 
Cardozo and Lon Fuller. 
32  Leading, possibly, to what Justice Cardozo referred to as enslaving, rather than 
illuminating or liberating the thought process: Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244 N.Y. 84, at 
94, 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926). As will be argued below, metaphors are much less effective when 
readers have incomplete or nonexistent understandings of them  my point is that architecture is a 
very complex amalgam of art, science, sociology, history and other human endeavours that does not 
reduce well to a specific idea about our Constitution. 
33  Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 64 (emphasis added). 
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particularities of constitutional architecture as metaphor. As a structural 
engineer before studying law, I have long been interested in architecture. 
With its multiple meanings, inherent indeterminacy and illusory nature, 
however, “architecture” seems a peculiar choice for the Supreme Court 
to rely on in coming to terms with Canada’s Constitution and institutions.  
IV. ARCHITECTURE 
The metaphor of architecture attempts to offer a physical form to 
mere words, to reinforce the stability of our Constitution. However, the 
main difficulty with using architecture as a metaphor for our Constitution 
is that architecture itself is full of uncertainty  to such an extent that, as 
seen in the quote of world famous architect Daniel Liebeskind, it needs a 
constitutional metaphor to provide an explanation of what it can do!  
The foundations [of the old World Trade Centre slurry walls] 
withstood the unimaginable trauma of the destruction and stand as 
eloquent as the Constitution itself asserting the durability of 
Democracy and the value of individual life.34  
Architecture is not simply about the design of buildings nor about 
their stability. Buildings are not ends in themselves; they are as much 
about the ideas we bring within them as the physical structure itself. As 
the critic Rowan Moore says, architecture is the interpretation, in three-
dimensions, of both inside and outside spaces.35 Space is something for 
the imagination to inhabit. Such things as material, scale, light and 
ornament give space a climate, which prompts associations, harbours 
memories and provokes thoughts.  
Classical architecture is characterized by symmetry, order, harmony, the 
precedence of exterior over interior, day over night, fixed over mobile, 
volume over surface, form over ornament.36 Surprisingly, some of these 
                                                                                                                       
34  Daniel Liebeskind, quoted in Ekaterina V. Haskins and Justin P. DeRose, “Memory, Visibility 
and Public Space: Reflections on Commemoration(s) of 9/11” (2003) 6 Space and Culture 377, at 390. 
35  Rowan Moore, Why We Build (Picador, 2012) [hereinafter “Moore”], at 20-21. It should 
be noted that architects themselves would have difficulty agreeing on a definition of what 
“architecture” is. For purposes of this article, I rely heavily on Moore’s important contribution, but I 
recognize that he has a certain vision of architecture that may not be shared. There is much more that 
has been and could be discussed, debated and argued about architecture; I make no claims to 
understanding its complexity. My main argument regarding the complexity of architecture as 
metaphor, however, is bolstered by its contestability  a deep understanding of the debates within 
the field of architecture is not necessary, I believe, to the points I raise. 
36  Id., at 151. 
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attributes give architecture a “gender”, at least for a large part of its history. 
Geometry and order were both considered male characteristics, whereas 
ornament, mobility and surface were considered female. Large, important 
public buildings were male, the home female.37 Obviously, these are based 
on prejudices or stereotypes about sex and gender that are no longer widely 
accepted. The important point is that it is not inevitable, as Moore puts it, 
that “order, division, propriety, fixity and daylight [are architecture’s] 
dominant qualities and values. They are not immutable or eternal, but made 
by certain attitudes by certain people at certain times and places”.38  
If we accept that architecture is more than simply a building, the use 
of it as a metaphor for our Constitution might be a source of some 
consternation. While there may be others, my concerns fall into two main 
areas: architecture as illusion and its dynamic nature. 
1.  Architecture as Illusion, Not Simply Physical Reality 
We think of architecture as a solid, fixed and permanent thing. That 
it is about the creation of single and singular objects. That it is visual.  
For many architects, values and aspirations such as hope, the wish 
for power or money, an idea of home, and a sense of mortality are fixed, 
definite and realizable in matter. The assumption is that there is a close 
alignment of form and content: an orderly design will lead to orderly 
people within it. A happy, carefree design will liberate whereas a stern, 
brutalist structure will repress. To some extent, Daniel Liebeskind 
exemplifies this kind of architect. He imagines buildings can carry fixed 
meanings. For example, in his proposal for rebuilding the World Trade 
Center after the devastating collapse of the Twin Towers, the “Freedom 
Tower” would be 1,776 feet tall, representing the creation, on July 4 of 
that year, of the United States of America.39 
                                                                                                                       
37  Id. For accounts of gender in architecture, see: Iain Borden, Barbara Penner and Jane 
Rendell eds., Gender Space Architecture: An Interdisciplinary Introduction (London: Routledge, 
2000); Joseph Rykwert, The Dancing Column: On Order in Architecture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1996); and Helen Hills, ed., Architecture and the Politics of Gender in Early Modern Europe 
(London: Ashgate, 2003). 
38  Moore, supra, note 35, at 154. 
39  The “Freedom Tower” moniker was actually coined by Governor George Pataki in 2002. 
Libeskind’s original vision for the entire development was ultimately abandoned. The tower that was 
eventually built has retained a height of 1,776 feet, but is now called One World Trade Center. See 
Elizabeth Greenspan, “Daniel Libeskind’s World Trade Center Change of Heart,” New Yorker, 
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This is fine, as far as it goes. However, architecture does not always 
respond to this kind of direct symbolism; buildings do not always listen 
to their makers. Buildings can be powerful instruments, but that is the 
point, they are instruments rather than ends in themselves. In truth, as 
Moore argues, such symbols may be seen as rhetorical devices that 
assume buildings function as something similar to speech: we should 
avoid buildings that “try to behave too much like words”.40 The moment 
that one attempts to translate a building’s message into words (“1776 feet 
tall represents the founding of America”), the building’s potential might 
be narrowed. The nature of construction only allows for clumsy and 
ponderous “sentences”, compared to the thoughtfulness, nuance and 
sophistication of writing and speaking. If the vast expense and labour put 
into most building projects is just a banal attempt at stating something 
that could have been written, it may not be worth the trouble.41 
Moreover, symbolism is itself highly contingent. 
Buildings are powerful objects for creating illusions; they are not 
always what they seem. Often the role of architecture is to suggest one 
thing  such as propriety  in order that the opposite  passion, danger, 
transgression  can happen. Even the most respectable buildings are 
shaped, at some level, by instincts or ideas about desire. The feelings a 
building emits or contains, however, are often contradictory, or at least 
apprehended in a very subjective fashion.42  
Take, as an example, the original World Trade Center. When 
developing the buildings in 1964, the architect Minoru Yamasaki based 
his concept on the then nascent belief that world trade would be a 
unifying force for all humanity. World trade would mean world peace; it 
represented humans’ belief in humanity; it highlighted our need for 
individual dignity but also cooperation, and through that cooperation 
would come greatness. The World Trade Center would embody this 
ideal: “[the towers] are intended to give man a soaring feeling, imparting 
pride and a sense of nobility in his environment.”43 Of course, these 
ideals were quickly ridiculed. Once built, critics derided the towers as 
                                                                                                                       
August 28, 2013, online: <http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/daniel-libeskinds-world-
trade-center-change-of-heart>. 
40  Moore, supra, note 35, at 92. 
41  Id., at 88. 
42  Id., at 20. 
43  Minoru Yamasaki, A Life in Architecture (New York: Weatherhill, 1979), at 114. 
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representing “giant cigarette cartons”,44 “tombstone-like monoliths”45 or 
“a standing monument to architectural boredom”.46  
Almost 30 years after they were built, another student of 
architecture, Mohammed Atta, who flew a plane into one of the towers, 
had a completely different view from Yamasaki. In Atta’s mind they 
were extravagant citadels of imperial arrogance that must be destroyed 
 or at least they could be perceived that way by others. Where 
Yamasaki saw inclusion, the 9/11 terrorists saw exclusion; where the 
terrorists saw two hostile projections signifying everything that was 
wrong with the West, the architect saw a welcome to the world.47  
All these beliefs are true; yet, at the same time, none of them are. 
Architectural meanings are by nature inherently slippery. They are prone 
to tricks of perception and inversions of value. Their effects are unstable, 
and their meanings elusive. 
Another illusion of architecture is that it is benign. Instead, the 
disturbing truth is that architecture is very often intimate with power. To 
complete an architectural project requires authority, money and 
ownership. To build itself requires an exertion of power: power over 
materials, over construction workers, over land, over neighbours and 
future inhabitants. Dictators and architects have enjoyed a long 
relationship. They both are driven by the desire to dominate and shape 
the world: 
Some of the most admired tourist destinations in the world have as a 
large part of their agenda the placing of some people over others. 
Domination is confirmed in the language attached to architecture…part 
of the thrill or impressiveness of architecture lies in its exercise of 
power, and sometimes, cruelty.48 
                                                                                                                       
44  Thomas Meehan, “Does Mega-Architecture Work?” (accessed on March 29, 2015), online: 
<https://horizonhardcover.wordpress.com/tag/world-trade-center/>. 
45  Philip Nobel, Sixteen Acres: Architecture and the Outrageous Struggle for the Future of 
Ground Zero (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), at 36. 
46  Id. 
47  See Moore, supra, note 35, at 249. Of course, what the World Trade Center Towers 
actually stood for is based on the Towers’ own evolution, history and perception generated by 
human users (and would therefore include earlier tragic events such as the 1993 car bombing by 
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef  for more on this incident, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower:  
Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2006)). This 
aspect, that buildings evolve in unforeseen and unknown ways because of human interaction with 
them, is discussed in the next section. 
48  Id., at 169, 171. 
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Of course, the power that is at the heart of architecture can be 
exercised fairly or unfairly. It can be generous and collaborative, or selfish; 
it can be made in pursuit of the public good or as an exercise of some 
personal obsession. Often, a building is a contradictory combination of all 
these impulses. When it is done well, the use of architectural power is not 
simply a matter of domination or exploitation but includes reciprocity 
between users, owners and designers, or some transmutation of individual 
might into shared freedoms. The question, therefore, is how the power is 
utilized  by whom, for whom, to whom.49 
A final illusion commonly associated with architecture is that it aspires 
to immortality. Classical architecture is very often about death: cenotaphs, 
pyramids and sarcophagi were the initial forms of classical architecture. 
Made of stone, concrete or masonry, they were intended to last millennia.  
A timeless building is thus often equated with a good building. But this call 
to eternity is sometimes overrated. The cult of timelessness overlooks the 
sometimes beneficial aspects of mobility and transience, and distorts our 
idea of what architecture is and should be. As an example, Moore relies on 
the Parthenon, commonly cited as an argument to timeless architecture 
against which all other buildings can be measured. For him, the current form 
of the Parthenon is grossly idealized. It ignores many of its past realities: that 
it was originally painted, that it had an interior resembling an Italian 
renaissance church in its extravagance, that it might have been “dressed” for 
ceremonies and theatre. In sum, it has, over centuries, dramatically changed 
itself physically and emotionally. What we see now is a manifestation of a 
structure that has been partly rebuilt, taken apart, had some of its stones 
replaced, lost its painted colouring and is no longer used in the same way it 
was originally.50  
Some of these illusions may work for a constitution. We may, for 
example, want to recognize that a constitution is about power. But my 
intuition tells me that we lawyers and judges don’t really know enough about 
architecture to know whether our constitutional illusions map accurately onto 
the illusions that buildings contain. And more likely, we lack the knowledge 
of architecture to realize the extent to which illusion plays a part in it. 
                                                                                                                       
49  One of the reviewers of an earlier draft of this article noted that not all building requires the 
services of architects. Much of human habitation is created out of necessity, ingenuity and availability; it is 
never finished, always changing. This is true, but it is peripheral to my, and the Court’s, use of 
“architecture” as a constitutional metaphor. In addition, the “power” that I allude to above (humans 
exercising dominion over materials and land, for example) is necessary in any construction that demarcates 
a place of living, whether or not an architect is involved and whether or not it is permanent or transient. 
50  Moore, supra, note 35, at 310. 
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2.  Architecture as Dynamic and Human, Not Static and Inanimate  
Architecture is not a thing of pure reason or function, but is shaped 
by human emotions and desires. In turn, those human desires and 
emotions are shaped by architecture. In many cases, architecture starts 
with a desire on the part of its makers, which might be a need for greater 
security, for a sense of grandeur, for rootedness to place, or simply for 
the rudiments of shelter, all of which can then be transformed into built 
reality. Once a building is built, it influences the emotions of those who 
experience and use it, while those initial desires continue to shape and 
change it.51  
Yet to say that there is emotion in architecture is only a bare 
beginning, for that raises many more questions about built matter. What 
forms do these emotions take? How is it that cold and insensate materials 
absorb and emit feeling? Whose feelings should matter: the architects, 
the architect’s clients’, the builders’, the users’, those of a commissioning 
government or corporation, or simply the casual passersby, local residents 
or tourists? Or, to take a different series of questions: if a building is 
beautiful, what is meant by that? Beautiful to whom? In what way? All 
such questions reflect a simple but relevant fact that architecture is 
nothing without humans. As the noted Brazilian architect Lina Bo Bardi 
puts it, “[u]ntil man enters a building, climbs its steps, and takes 
possession of the space in a ‘human adventure’ which develops over time, 
architecture does not exist.”52 
As I noted in the above section, an architect’s hope that form and 
content are always aligned is somewhat mistaken. Thanks to the many 
people and accidents that shape it, a building that is supposed to produce 
one effect often ends up producing very different effects.53 There are, in 
other words, many ways in which human impulses are played out in 
buildings. It is why definitions of architecture need to be broad: they 
need to encompass not just the design of buildings, but of the spaces 
inside and out which might be formed and changed by their construction 
and the emotions and chance encounters of humans engaged with them.  
Buildings act not alone or in isolation, but reciprocally with the 
people and things around them. What buildings can do, depending on of 
what and of how they are made, is change the physical and social 
                                                                                                                       
51  Id., at 18. 
52  Id., at 23. 
53  Id., at 92. 
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experience of things they serve. A good building has to be open to 
chance encounters, the passage of time and life in general. Many 
architects despair over the fact that a building is not always inhabited 
physically and psychically in the way they predict. But buildings are also 
“built” by their users, in the way in which the imaginations and 
experiences of people in them affect them.54 Regardless of what an 
architect may design, lives will be lived in and around a building, 
exploiting, subverting, misusing and ignoring the forms that have been 
provided.55 As a result, architecture can be both an agent of change and a 
reflection of it.  
A constitution does not act in isolation, either. Nor would it be much 
to speak of a constitution without us. A good constitution will be open to 
time and to the human lives that live under it. And like many architects, 
the framers of a constitution don’t always like the way a constitution 
takes shape (an oft-referred to example in Canada is with the substantive 
conception of section 7, as the Supreme Court found in Reference re 
Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia)).56  
There are limits to this, however. To ask of a constitution that it be 
open to chance or randomness, that it reflect the daily lives of its “users” 
is pushing things a little too far, in my view. Unlike a building, a 
constitution’s users are everywhere in time and place; they may not have 
the same direct interaction with the “words on parchment” that a 
building’s users have.57 The boundary of a constitution is therefore 
somewhat different from the boundary of a building. 
All of this is to say that I wonder whether the Supreme Court is 
aware that its architectural metaphor might be overly simplistic or taken 
too far. At a minimum, it seems to me, when relying on such a metaphor 
there is a need to understand the complex nature of architecture itself 
(without necessarily understanding the substance of the complexities), 
and the possibility that the metaphor may be interpreted in these complex 
ways (without necessarily understanding exactly how). While 
architecture and constitutions do share some common traits, as often as 
not, some may be led astray by thinking of the constitution in 
architectural terms. A metaphor based on architecture may do an 
                                                                                                                       
54  Id., at 381. 
55  Id., at 56. 
56  [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
57  Walton H. Hamilton’s original words, cited in Richard S. Kay, “American 
Constitutionalism” in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, Larry Alexander, ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), at 16. 
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injustice to our understanding of constitutions; as a result, we should be 
very cautious in relying on it. 
V. “ARCHITECTURE” AND INTERPRETING A CONSTITUTION 
So what is useful and what is not in contemplating the metaphor of 
the architecture of our Constitution? An enduring metaphor in 
architecture, Rowan claims, is of the building as a microcosm of the 
world.58 We want buildings to stimulate, give cues, propose and provoke 
responses in its citizenry. To engage, give evidence of human presence, 
reveal what could not have been imagined, and at the same time offer 
places for our own imagination to inhabit. This is what we would want in 
a constitution.  
Constitutions are also similar to architecture in that they are 
constrained in ways that other forms of artistic and practical human 
endeavour are not. While writers and visual artists, especially in the  
20th century, could travel deep into the psychology of nihilism and 
despair, it is not something architects can easily do. An architect cannot 
realistically ask his or her clients to invest in darkness or alienation 
simply to satisfy a creative urge.  
The constitution as architecture is a bit like this too. Constitutions 
cannot nor should not be full of despair. The words need to rise, to 
inspire and aspire. Architecture requires the cooperation of many people, 
machines and materials, coming together to create a solid, useable object. 
As Moore puts it, merely to build is hopeful; in my view, having an 
effective working constitution is equally so.59 
The assumed power of architecture to last for generations is also 
something we might typically hope for with a constitution. But, as 
shown, a deeper understanding of architecture forces us to realize this is 
not the reality. Architecture changes from the very first day a building 
opens. That kind of transience is not necessarily what is wanted in a 
                                                                                                                       
58  Moore, supra, note 35, at 46. 
59  I recognize that sometimes buildings may be dark and lacking hope  prisons would be 
a good example. Constitutions can be instruments of dehumanization as well  the Weimar 
Constitution an oft-cited example of such: see William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011) (“on paper, the most liberal 
and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had seen … guarantee[ing] the working 
of an almost flawless democracy” (at 56)). My argument is that both, in their idealized forms, should 
strive for a vision of civilization that is aspirational. Even prisons can be places of humanity. 
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constitution. To be effective, a constitution needs to be “practically 
certain”. It is, in my view, not necessarily a bad thing that a constitution 
be somewhat elusive or unstable. However, there are limits: no 
constitution should ever deliberately intend to be an illusion. We want 
constitutions to represent the purpose that is contained therein  it is, 
after all, a constitution, which makes it different from other forms of 
written text. It is not meant to read like a play, a work of literature or a 
memoir or a contract; it is not even a statute or other law. Legal texts 
require, in my view, a degree of certainty and predictability that is 
unnecessary in plays or works of fiction. Any elusiveness we find in a 
constitution is likely intended, and moreover, will be reduced over time. 
We want constitutions to become more understood, more attuned to the 
society we live in as they mature. With a building, that may not be 
desirable (sometimes transience is useful) or even possible (humans may 
shape a building in unknown ways).  
Finally, the expanded definition of architecture as the manipulation 
of space causes concerns for the concept of the architecture of a 
constitution. A space cannot be equally available to all possible uses and 
people, not at the same time, and not over the course of time. It will 
always belong to some more than others, mean more and have greater 
purpose to some users over others. This is not how we want to portray a 
Constitution nor is it how a constitution operates. It, in contrast, is a 
reflection of a broader constituency; particularly in Canada, where the 
constitution exists for a geographic land mass that is vastly different 
from the space occupied by a building.  
What are we left with? The Reference relied on the architectural 
metaphor 11 times. Based on appearances alone, it is hard to ignore it. 
Despite this, it is possible that my concern is overblown. Maybe the 
metaphor, at its heart, simply means the basic organizing structure of our 
Constitution. That, for example, the Senate forms one part of the 
structure of what we call the governing institutions of Canada (as the 
heading between sections 20 and 21 of the Constitution Act, 1867 titled 
“The Senate” confirms) and nothing more than that.  
I hope that this is the sole basis for the Court’s invoking the 
metaphor. It is certainly possible. The Court has referred to the “structure 
of the constitution” in other instances. In fact, “structure” was also 
repeated 14 times in the Reference. As well, there are at least 30 
instances where it has used “structure” in constitutional decisions in 
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relation to the organization of our Constitution.60 As Warren Newman 
states, there is a potentially straightforward reason for using architecture 
as a metaphor in a case such as the Reference: that the Senate is actually 
a building  an upper house  that has an external architecture!61 His 
                                                                                                                       
60  See, for example, Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince 
Edward Island, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 103, 108, 317, 319 (S.C.C.) 
(“Provincial Judges Reference”); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 217, at paras. 44, 50 (“internal architecture”), 51, 62 (S.C.C.) (note also that the Secession 
Reference also relies on the “constitutional framework”, which is another building metaphor); 
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 87 
and 88 (S.C.C.) (using “architecture”); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, 
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 349 (S.C.C.) (quoting “internal architecture” from Reference re 
Secession of Quebec); Ontario Home Builders’ Assn. v. York Regional Board of Education, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 80, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929, at paras. 92, 96, 98, 99, 122, 134, 137 (S.C.C.); Air Canada v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1986] S.C.J. No. 68, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539, at para. 14 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, at paras. 72, 80 (S.C.C.); Trial 
Lawyers of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2014] S.C.J. No. 59, [2014] 3 
S.C.R. 31, at paras. 26, 93 (S.C.C.); OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, 
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at para. 151 (S.C.C.); R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 
para. 24 (S.C.C.); Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] S.C.J. No. 115, [1996] 3 
S.C.R. 854, at paras. 29, 82 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
213, at paras. 110, 116 (S.C.C.); McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2013] S.C.J. 
No. 67, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 895, at para. 9 (S.C.C.); Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 
62, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, at para. 7 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, 
at para. 77 (S.C.C.); Morgard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] S.C.J. No. 135, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
1077, at para. 39 (S.C.C.); Reference re: Goods and Services Tax (GST), [1992] S.C.J. No. 62, 
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 445, at para. 88 (S.C.C.); Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) (“the general constitutional and 
judicial architecture of Canada”); Ell v. Alberta, [2003] S.C.J. No. 35, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, 2003 
SCC 35, at para. 22 (S.C.C.); Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pembina Exploration Canada Ltd., 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 9, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 29 (S.C.C.); McMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 101, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 1, 9 (S.C.C.); Reference re Wartime Leasehold 
Regulations, [1950] S.C.J. No. 1, [1950] S.C.R. 124, at 145 (S.C.C.); Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty 
Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.); Hunt v. T&N plc, 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.); Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of 
Education), [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2003 SCC 62, at para. 35 (S.C.C.); Mackin v. 
New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, at paras. 69, 70, 72 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at paras. 35, 49 (S.C.C.); 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 at para. 123 
(S.C.C.); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at 137 (S.C.C.); and 
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.). 
61  See Newman, supra, note 17. As he puts it, “It is, in retrospect, small wonder that the 
Supreme Court resorted to the structural metaphor of the ‘architecture of the Constitution’ and its 
close variants in describing the outline and the protected features of central political and judicial 
institutions like the Senate of Canada and the Court itself. The Senate is, after all, an upper house. 
And those institutions, like the House of Commons and office of the Governor General, certainly 
have an external architecture, be it neo-classical, neo-gothic or neo-Florentine” (at 34; emphasis in 
original). 
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point, well taken, is that it may make perfect sense to rely on the 
metaphor of architecture when dealing with the institutions of 
government since there are physical buildings representing those 
institutions that make the metaphor easier to understand. Therefore, a 
more generous reading of the Reference is that, in effect, all that is really 
meant by “constitutional architecture” is that our Constitution is not 
devoid of structure.  
It’s a simple idea. That, for example, there are headings and 
subheadings that set out discrete components of our constitutional 
provisions. That there is a coherent logic  through listing bodies and 
institutions such as “Executive Power”, the “House of Commons”, 
“Legislative Power” and the “Judicature” as examples set out in the 1867 
Act and the “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”, “Rights of the 
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” and “General” as examples from the 
1982 Act. That this literal structuring of the text then translates into 
certain conceptual structuring of constitutional ideas and norms.  
Mies van Der Rohe says a similar thing about architecture: “by 
structure we have a philosophical idea. That structure is the whole from 
top to bottom, to the last detail — with the same ideas. That is what we 
call structure.”62 If van Der Rohe were a judge on the Supreme Court of 
Canada, would he caution against using “architecture” instead of 
“structure”? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If there truly is an architecture to our Constitution, let’s imagine 
ourselves taking a walking tour inside of it. I enter, through the 
preamble, which isn’t as grand as I was led to believe.63 I am now inside 
the Constitution. Its text is formed by power plays, by gambles, by 
ideals, virtues, religion, scholarship, politics, realpolitik, accidents and 
adaptations. I can see how it was promoted by individuals, political 
parties, members of different groups, skeptics and optimists. Some of it 
was enacted at the founding of the country; other parts were amended or 
added later on. Its very insides have been criticized, sold, advertised, 
downplayed, debated and upheld. Its text is used, interpreted, cited and 
relied upon in ways foreseen and unforeseen by its makers.  
                                                                                                                       
62  Franz Schulze & Edward Windhorst, Mies van der Rohe: A Critical Biography (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), at 194. 
63  Chief Justice Lamer, in Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 60, para. 109. 
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It is subject to time, taste, other laws, ideas about freedom and 
liberty, changes in sentiment, customs, mood, activity and fear. It will 
respond more or less readily to these influences, sometimes enhancing, 
sometimes suppressing or opposing them. 
Our Constitution might command attention, or move or provoke, but 
it will never exist independently of us who are around it, and our events 
and thoughts that occur in time. I have learned that one description of 
bad architecture is that it ignores this inescapable circumstance. I hope 
that all lawyers, academics, judges and others, learn that any description 
of our Constitution that seeks external support from metaphors, also risks 
losing sight of what it ultimately signifies. 
 
